Ⅰ. Introduction
Recently there has been active research measuring systemic risks. As a lesson from the global financial crisis, it has been recognized that a banking supervision that focuses only on individual financial institutions may neglect the contributions to systemic risk of individual financial institutions. In particular, there have been some studies on the measurement of systemic risks using financial market variables such as equity prices or credit default swap (CDS) spreads, to make use of the forwardlooking nature of financial market variables.
In this paper we investigate two systemic risk measures -the MES (marginal expected shortfall) and the CoVaR -which utilize equity market information. We apply both measures to the Korean banking sector. Until now, research on systemic risk has been mainly focused on the US financial system, which is characterized by the market-based "shadow banking" system. In contrast, main players in Korean financial system are still commercial banks. Thus we may have results different from the existing studies when the bank-based financial system is analyzed through the lens of systemic risk. Our result may have important implications for other bank-based financial systems.
The MES has been employed by Acharya et al. (2010) and Brownlees and Engle (2012) to evaluate the systemic risk contributions of individual financial institutions.
The CoVaR was proposed for the first time by Adrian and Brunnermeier in 2008, who computed the CoVaR by a quantile regression method. Since then, many applications of the CoVaR have been implemented to measure various economies' systemic risks.
Particularly, Girardi and Ergun (2013) estimate the CoVaR by multivariate GARCH models. Details will be discussed in the next section.
The two systemic risk measures are different in the ways in which they view the contribution to systemic risk of an individual financial institution. The MES defines the systemic risk contribution as the expected equity returns of an individual financial institution conditional on the market being distressed (e.g., when daily market returns are below -2%). The CoVaR is on the other hand defined as the VaR (value-at-risk) of the market returns (e.g., the 5% quantile of the conditional distribution of the daily market returns) conditional on the distress of a financial institution (e.g., when the equity return of that institution is at its VaR). In sum, the two measures differ in their directions given to the "cause and effect" behind systemic risk. On the "cause" side, the MES puts the distress of the market while the CoVaR places the distress of an individual financial institution. Both measures are popularly used systemic risk measures, and it is therefore important to understand how differently they evaluate the systemic risk contributions of financial institutions.
In addition to evaluating the systemic risk contributions of Korean banks via these two systemic risk measures, we propose an overall systemic risk indicator using the aggregate MES, since unlike the CoVaR measure the MES provides a reasonable economic interpretation. We can interpret the aggregate MES as the marginal expected shortfall of the returns of a portfolio consisting of individual banks' equities when the market returns fall below a certain threshold level. This aggregate systemic risk measure is similar in spirit to the overall SRISK index in Brownlees and Engle (2012) .
The overall SRISK index will be described in the next section. To use the aggregate MES for an early warning system, we apply a threshold VAR model to analyze the dynamic relationship between the systemic risk indicator and real economic activity.
From analysis of this threshold VAR model, we can obtain a threshold value that can trigger a warning signal of financial instability.
To compute both systemic risk measures we use the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) models proposed by Engle (2002) , which are types of multivariate GARCH models. The multivariate GARCH models have an advantage in capturing the time-varying systemic risk exposure of a financial institution or the market -an advantage not shared by the quantile regression method that has also been very popular for measuring systemic risk. To compute the MES and the CoVaR measures, we depend respectively on Brownlees and Engle (2012) and Girardi and Ergun (2013) .
However, unlike their original methods we use the Monte Carlo simulation method to compute both systemic risk measures.
Our empirical analysis finds the following. First, that although the two systemic risk measures differ in defining systemic risk contributions, both are qualitatively very similar in explaining the cross-sectional differences in systemic risk contributions across banks. Second, that the systemic risk contributions are closely related to some bank characteristic variables (e.g., VaR, size and leverage ratio). However, there are differences between the cross-sectional and the time series dimensions in the effects of these variables. Lastly, that the dynamic relationship between financial shocks and real economic activity may vary substantially when the aggregate MES exceeds a certain threshold. The aggregate MES and its associated threshold value suggested in this paper are expected to offer useful information for financial instability monitoring.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 selectively reviews the existing studies of systemic risk measurement using financial market information.
Section 3 explains how the MES and the CoVaR are computed. Section 4 presents the results of empirical analysis, and Section 5 draws conclusions. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) propose a pioneering systemic risk method called the CoVaR.
II. Literature Review
1 The CoVaR is the VaR of the financial system conditional on institutions being under distress. They model the joint dynamics of the equity returns of individual financial institutions and of the financial system using a quantile regression method. To be specific, they define an institution's contribution to systemic risk as the difference between the CoVaR conditional on that institution being under distress and the CoVaR when the institution is in a normal state. Considering this point, caution is necessary in using CDS spreads in measuring systemic risk in Asian emerging markets, and this paper thus uses equity returns instead. As is well known, the issue of market liquidity related to the equity market in Korea does not arise.
In addition to the CoVaR, we also study the MES as a systemic risk measure. Acharya et al. (2010) use the MES as an input to their systemic risk measure called the SES (systemic expected shortfall). The SES, which is used to measure a financial institution's systemic risk contribution, is defined as an individual bank's propensity to be undercapitalized when the financial system as a whole is undercapitalized. They assume that capital shortages of individual financial institutions when the overall financial system is unstable can impose an externality on the rest of the economy.
They estimate the ex ante MES and leverage using daily equity returns from the year prior to the global financial crisis, which they then use to explain the cross-sectional variations in equity returns performances during the crisis.
Subsequently, Brownlees and Engle (2012) also argue that a financial institution that is highly likely to be unstable when the financial system is unstable tends to have a high degree of contribution to systemic risk. They however propose a new methodology, by arguing that it is not likely that regression estimates based on the global financial crisis will offer suitable guidance in a future crisis. Like Girardi and Ergun (2013) , Brownlees and Engle (2012) also employ the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model proposed by Engle (2002) 
III. Methodology

MES
Our MES (marginal expected shortfall) measures are computed based on Brownlees and Engle (2012) . As noted above, the MES is used to measure the contribution of each bank to overall systemic risk. According to Brownlees and Engle (2012) , the MES at date  is defined as
where  , and  , indicate the daily market index return (e.g., KOSPI 200 index returns) and a specific bank i's daily equity returns at date , respectively. In Equation
(1),  is a threshold value to represent the systemic event and, like in Brownlees and Engle (2012) , set to -2%.
As explained earlier, in order to estimate the MES we employ the DCC (dynamic -7 -conditional correlation) model developed by Engle (2002) . The conditional means for both the market and an individual bank's equity returns are assumed as AR (1) processes. We denote them by  , and  , , respectively. We then estimate univariate GARCH models by using the residuals filtered by the AR(1) models, and thus now consider a bivariate process of the market and a bank's equity returns as:
where  , and  , are assumed to be independent error terms. 3 Note that  , and  , can be easily obtained via Choleski factorization. The above specification in Equation (2) amounts to the conditional capital asset pricing model (CAPM) with time-varying betas. That is, Equation (2) can also be written as
where  , is a time-varying beta coefficient. Therefore, the bivariate model can be interpreted as a dynamic conditional beta model, which allows the beta coefficient seen in a general CAPM to be time-varying. 4 In this way, our DCC specification can -8 -capture the time-varying nature of systemic risk exposure for each bank.
The conditional volatilities and correlations of the bivariate process defined in Equation (2) are modeled as follows:
For the individual GARCH processes we employ a threshold GARCH model, which was proposed by Glosten et al. (1993) , that can capture a negative relationship between the volatilities and equity returns. To be specific, the conditional volatility dynamics are specified by
where
, and  , is an indicator function that has a value of 1 if  , < 0, and  , is defined in the same manner. In Equation (5),
 is a coefficient to capture the leverage effect. Given that the conditional volatilities are estimated using the threshold GARCH model, the conditional correlations are estimated using the following DCC model of Engle (2002):
Here  , follows a process of
where  , * is a standardized residual with unit variance as below:
and   denotes an unconditional correlation.
Given the conditional volatilities and correlations, we can then estimate the MES at date t. Given Equation (2) and the threshold value , the MES is represented as
We obtain the fourth equality because  , and  , are assumed to be independent. 5 As shown in Equation (9), the distribution of  , (and  , under a no independence assumption) has to be specified in order to calculate the MES. In this paper we use an empirical distribution in order to take into account the fat tails observed in equity returns. 6 In other words, we collect { ,  } from the outcome of the DCC estimation, and conduct the following Monte Carlo integration to compute the conditional expectation in the last line of Equation (9):
is an indicator function that takes 1 if the argument is true and takes zero otherwise.
CoVaR
As noted, our CoVaR measure is based on Girardi and Ergun (2013) . First, Girardi and Ergun (2013) define the value-at-risk of a bank i ( ,  ) as the q-th quantile of the return distribution
The CoVaR is now defined as
The conditioning event is that the bank i's return is less than or equal to its VaR.
The CoVaR is the q-th quantile of the market return conditional on this conditioning event. Note that this definition of the CoVaR differs from that of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) , for whom the conditioning event is that a bank i is exactly at its
VaR. Girardi and Ergun (2013) argue that their new definition of the CoVaR facilitates backtesting, and furthermore that the new CoVaR becomes a continuous and increasing function of the interdependence between the market and bank i, which the original CoVaR measure is not.
The systemic risk contribution of an individual bank i can be measured by the following ΔCoVaR measure: As in the computation of the MES measure, we also employ the DCC model. We have to consider the following specification in Equation (14), however, because, in contrast to the MES, the CoVaR considers the direction from an individual bank to the market:
Here, as in the MES,  , and  , are assumed to be independent error terms.
In order to model the distributions of  , and  , , Girardi and Ergun (2013) employ a certain parametric asymmetric distribution -i.e., Hansen's skewed t-distribution.
They then analytically solve for the CoVaR and ΔCoVaR. Different from Girardi and Ergun (2013) , and also as in the case with the MES, we use the empirical distributions of  , and  , , for which we find the computer coding simpler.
For example, suppose that we wish to compute a 5% CoVaR. First we compute the CoVaR using Equation (14) . From the outcomes of the DCC estimation, we then save { ,  } and { ,  }. From { ,  } we can compute the 5% quantile of  ,  , and collect the values that are smaller than this 5% quantile. We denote this collection by
Given a simulated pair of  , and  , , the conditional means ( , and  , ), conditional volatilities ( , and  , ) and conditional correlation ( , ), we can obtain one realization of  , . By iterating this procedure sufficiently many times (e.g., 10,000 times), we can obtain the CoVaR measure, i.e. the 5% quantile from the -12 -collection of simulated  , 's. The benchmark CoVaR can be computed in a similar manner. Thus, using the CoVaR and the benchmark CoVaR, we can compute
ΔCoVaR as in Equation (13).
IV. Empirical Results
Data
Among Korean banks, we study those whose stocks are listed on the Korea Exchange, with the resulting ten banks consisting of five nationwide banks (Woori, Korea Exchange, KB, Hana and Shinhan), four local banks (Daegu, Busan, Jeju and Chunbuk), and one specialized bank (the Industrial Bank of Korea). Among them, Woori, KB, Shinhan, Hana, Daegu and Busan were converted to financial holding companies during our sample period, and with the equity return data for some banks thus no longer available we use the equity returns for their holding companies instead.
Since the data on these ten banks are simultaneously available during the period of July 2002 through March 2013, we study the systemic risks during this sample period.
We also use some bank characteristic data (e.g., financial statement data) for conducting our sample correlation and panel regression analyses below, which are available as quarterly data from the financial information system of the Financial Supervisory Service. In Section 4.4 we construct the aggregate MES on a monthly basis as an overall systemic risk indicator. For this purpose we need the monthly series of banks' book equities, which are obtained through linear interpolation of the quarterly data.
Estimation Results of the DCC Models
We employ multivariate GARCH models in order to compute both the MES and the CoVaR measures. As mentioned, the DCC model of Engle (2002) is used. We avoid a detailed description of the DCC estimation results for want of space, but it is noteworthy that the leverage coefficients of their daily equity returns ('s in Equation (5)) are estimated as significant for six banks. In this regard, the leverage effect is thus necessary for modeling daily equity returns. Figure 1 shows the main outcomes from the DCC estimations. For illustration purposes, we report the medians of the conditional correlations, conditional volatilities (standard deviations) and conditional betas over time. Among them, the top panel in Figure 1 shows the time-varying conditional correlation. As can be seen, there is considerable variation over time -ranging from 0.2 to 0.7. As pointed out in the existing studies, conditional correlations tend to rise during periods of financial instability, and our study also shows the conditional correlation to have increased In contrast to the case with the conditional correlation, the level of the conditional standard deviation is not so high at the time of the 2011 euro area fiscal crisis.
Finally, the bottom panel of Figure 1 illustrates the time series of the median of banks' conditional betas. As mentioned above, since these conditional betas take into account both individual banks' correlations with the financial system and their conditional standard deviations, they are appropriate tools for evaluating individual banks' risks in the context of the financial system. As can be expected, the conditional We next investigate the relationships between the systemic risk measures and some bank characteristic variables. We use its VaR, log of equity, and leverage ratio as the bank characteristic variables. Like Girardi and Ergun (2013), we compute the VaR measures using Equation (11); they are thus outcomes of threshold GARCH estimation. As before, we use the sample periods of 2002-2007 and 2008-2013 . We let the log of its total equity proxy the bank's size. We can also find a significant relationship between the bank size variable (i.e., the log Rather unexpectedly, however, it is found likely that there is no significant positive relationship between the leverage ratio and the MES.
Figure 5: MES and Banks' Characteristics
Note: The scatter diagrams plot the bank characteristic variable (VaR, log of equity and leverage ratio) versus the MES, for during 2002-2007 and 2008-2013. A similar analysis is conducted for the ΔCoVaR measure, and as shown in Figure   6 we obtain results similar to those for the MES. The correlations between ΔCoVaR In the above analysis, the most important result is that the bank's size is significantly and positively associated with the systemic risk contribution of that bank.
It is also notable that, different from the past studies undertaken on US banks, the relationships between the VaRs of individual banks and their systemic risk contributions are significantly positive. However, the relationship between the systemic risk contribution and the leverage ratio turns out to be weak for both the MES and ΔCoVaR. It should however be noted that, since we use long-run averages for each subsample, our analysis reveals only cross-sectional implications. We can thus only argue at most that, at least in the cross-sectional dimension, there is no substantial relationship between the leverage ratio and the contribution to systemic risk.
In order to find the main determinants of the contributions to systemic risk of individual banks in the time series as well as the cross-sectional dimension, we conduct a panel data regression analysis with quarterly data (i.e., from 2002.Q3 to 2013.Q1). For explanatory variables we employ each bank's characteristic variables, along with macro variables and financial market variables. To avoid the possible endogeneity problem, we use explanatory variables lagged by one quarter. For the dependent variables, we use the quarterly average of either the MES or ΔCoVaR. As control variables, moreover, we include each bank's financial statement variables reflecting liquidity, capital adequacy, profitability and asset quality. Considering that our data is a long panel with a small cross section and long time series, we do not include a time dummy among the explanatory variables. Rather, we use several macro and financial market variables to take into account the potential time effects. To address the robustness of our results, we employ several panel data estimation methods such as pooled OLS (POLS), a fixed effect (FE) model, a random effect (RE) model and a dynamic panel model (Arellano and Bond, 1992) 7 . as the cross-sectional dimension. As noted above, this differs from the findings of past studies of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and Girardi and Ergun (2013) .
Importantly, we also obtain positive and significant coefficients for the leverage ratio across all models considered. Recall that, in the pure cross-sectional analysis discussed above, we could not find a significantly positive relationship between the measures of systemic risk contribution and the leverage ratio. It seems, however, in the time-series context, that a higher leverage ratio at a bank tends to increase its contribution to systemic risk over time. Along with this result, it is also notable that the BIS capital adequacy ratio does not have a significant effect on the MES across all models. It has been argued that the role of the BIS capital adequacy ratio is limited, due to its pro-cyclical nature as well as to regulatory arbitrage. Consistent with this argument, after controlling for the effect of the leverage ratio we cannot find any significant effect of the BIS capital adequacy ratio.
In the cross-sectional analysis considered above, the size of a bank, which is proxied by the log of its equity, greatly affects the systemic risk contribution of that bank. However, in the results of estimation using the fixed effect and the dynamic panel models, which by construction remove the effects of time-invariant latent variables, the size of the bank loses its explanatory power over its systemic risk contribution. We have a significant positive coefficient for the log equity variable only in the Pooled OLS and random effect models, which can reflect the influences of timeinvariant heterogeneity across banks. It therefore seems that the size of a bank is associated with its contribution to systemic risk only in the cross-sectional dimension. Table 2 shows in addition that there are many macro and financial market variables which affect the MES to significant extents. Thus, consistent with the results in Figure 3 , banks' systemic risk contributions prove to be closely associated with the -24 -business cycle. (Arellano and Bond, 1992) , respectively. Explanatory variables listed in the table are lagged by one quarter, so "L." is put in front of the variable names. The explanatory variables are VaR, log of equity, leverage ratio, loan-deposit ratio, BIS capital adequacy ratio, non-performing loan ratio, return on assets, GDP, KOSPI, foreign exchange rate, volatility of foreign exchange rate, volatility of KOSPI and housing price. The symbols *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level, respectively. Table 3 reports the determinants of the ΔCoVaR measure. Since we obtain estimation results similar to those for the MES we skip detailed explanation, but should note that, in the case of ΔCoVaR, the relationship with the leverage effect is not as substantial as in the case of the MES. Only the random effect model provides a significant and positive coefficient for the leverage ratio.
-25 - (Arellano and Bond, 1992) , respectively. Explanatory variables listed in the table are lagged by one quarter, so "L." is put in front of the variable names. The explanatory variables are VaR, log of equity, leverage ratio, loan-deposit ratio, BIS capital adequacy ratio, non-performing loan ratio, return on assets, GDP, KOSPI, foreign exchange rate, volatility of foreign exchange rate, volatility of KOSPI and housing price. The symbols *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level, respectively.
It is also worth noting that, in the analyses in both Tables 2 and 3 , we obtain positive coefficients for the lagged GDP growth rate and negative coefficients for the lagged KOSPI index returns. The former finding may imply that systemic risks may accumulate during economic booms. It is likely that the latter finding is due to the leverage effect, whereby an increase in stock prices tends to accompany a decrease in stock price volatility.
Aggregate Systemic Risk Measures
One of the advantages of the MES is that it can be aggregated across banks, and the resulting aggregate provides a reasonable economic interpretation as the marginal expected shortfall of the return of the portfolio consisting of individual banks' equities conditional on the market returns being below a certain threshold level. We will denote this aggregate MES 8 as the weighted average of individual banks' MES, where the weights of the individual banks are proportional to their equities. In this section we examine whether this aggregate MES can play the role of overall systemic risk measure. We hope that it can be used as an early warning indicator for the overall financial system, which ΔCoVaR unfortunately cannot because it lacks this additivity.
Many policy decisions, including the central bank's policy rate determinations, are meanwhile made on a monthly basis, and many macroeconomic variables are also released on a monthly basis. It will thus be convenient if the overall systemic risk measures are constructed as monthly indicators, and considering this we construct a monthly overall systemic risk measure.
The upper panel of Figure 7 shows the trend of the aggregate MES over time. For comparison purposes, we also illustrate the aggregate ΔCoVaR in the lower panel. The aggregate ΔCoVaR is also computed as an equity-weighted average of the ΔCoVaRs of individual banks, although it is hard to find any economic meaning in the result. We can see that both aggregate measures tend to move together over time (the correlation is estimated to be 0.69). However, it seems that the aggregate ΔCoVaR cannot differentiate the extent of systemic risks across different crisis episodes. In contrast to the case with the aggregate MES, based on the aggregate ΔCoVaR the global financial crisis is not distinguishable from other crises. We focus now on the aggregate MES. From the upper panel of Figure 7 it can be seen that, after having increased with the global financial crisis, systemic risk later decreased but then rose again after the euro area fiscal crisis in 2011. And since then it has been declining steadily until now. As noted above, the aggregate MES exhibits different heights of peaks across the different crisis episodes.
If we use the aggregate MES to monitor overall systemic risk, it will be very useful to set a critical value that triggers some warning signal. To this end we conduct a threshold VAR (vector autoregression) analysis. Hollo et al. (2012) First, to test whether there is a threshold in the joint dynamics of these variables (i.e., the aggregate MES and the CI growth rate), we use Lo's and Zivot's (2001) threshold test, which extends Hansen's (1999) linearity test to a multi-variable setting.
The number of lags in the VAR specification and the lag of the threshold state variable are determined by the AIC and BIC criteria. Accordingly, the lag of VAR is set to 2, and the aggregate MES one month before is set as the threshold state variable. Figure 8 shows the results from Lo's and Zivot's (2001) threshold test. We use the package "tsDyn" in R, and the bootstrap method for the test. As shown in the upper panel, under the null hypothesis of "no threshold" and the alternative of "one threshold", we can reject the null hypothesis at a 5% significance level (p-value 0.02).
However, the lower panel shows that, for the null hypothesis of "no threshold" and the alternative of "two thresholds", we cannot reject the null hypothesis at a 5% significance level (p-value 0.158). As a result we consider a one-threshold VAR model.
Figure 8: Threshold Test Results
Note: The p-value is calculated as the proportion of the values that are greater than or equal to a test value shown in a red dotted line under the density obtained from the bootstrap method.
Under the assumption that there is one threshold, the threshold value of the aggregate MES that minimizes the sum of the squared residuals (SSR) is found to be 3.73% as shown in the upper panel of Figure 9 . The lower panel of Figure 9 shows that 76.4% of the total observations belong to a "stable" regime (with aggregate MESs below 3.73%) and 23.6% to an "unstable" regime (aggregate MESs above 3.73%). Given the estimated threshold value, we conduct an impulse response analysis to analyze the effects of financial shocks on the real economy across different regimes.
We use the structural threshold VAR model proposed by Balke (2000) as follows 10 : shocks do not have significant impacts on the real economy in the "stable" regime.
The lower panel indicates, however, that in the "unstable" regime, where the lagged aggregate MES exceeds the threshold value, financial shocks do have significant influence. In particular, they tend to do so with one-to two-month time lags. This is also shown in the variance decomposition results reported in Table 4 . In the "stable" regime, real economic shocks explain more than 97% of the rate in any forecasting horizon. In the "unstable" regime, however, financial shocks explain about 15~20% of the variations in the real economy.
Figure 10: Impulse Response Analysis
Note: Impulse responses of the rate of CI (composite index) growth to a one standard deviation shock of aggregate MES are plotted for both regimes.
As has been explained so far, when the financial system faces a regime of instability the dynamic relationship between financial shocks and the real economic cycle changes to a substantial extent. The aggregate MES and the associated threshold value can then be expected to offer useful information for the monitoring of financial stability. 
Impulse Responses in Unstable Regime
In this paper we study systemic risks in the Korean banking sector by using two systemic risk measures -the MES (Acharya et al. 2010, Brownlees and Engle 2012) and the CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier 2011, Girardi and Ergun 2013) . To compute both of them we employ Engle's (2002) DCC model. The DCC models can capture the time-varying nature of the systemic risk exposures of individual banks, a merit not shared by the quantile regression method also used to estimate the original CoVaR measure in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) .
The findings of our analysis are the following. First, we have compared these two systemic risk measures and focused on how differently they evaluate the contribution to systemic risk of an individual bank. We have found that, although the measures provide different rankings for the systemic risk contributions, they turn out to be qualitatively very similar in explaining the cross-sectional differences in systemic risk contributions across banks.
Second, using both systemic risk measures we have analyzed the relationships between some bank characteristic variables and banks' systemic risk contributions, via simple correlation analysis and panel data regression methods. We have seen that the VaR of an individual bank affects the systemic risk contribution of that bank, from both the cross-sectional and the time series dimensions. This result is in contrast to Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and Girardi and Ergun (2013) , who cannot find significant relationships between VaR and the systemic risk contribution measures for US banks. The leverage ratios are meanwhile not closely related to systemic risk contributions in the cross-sectional dimension, but an increase in the leverage ratio causes a rise in systemic risk contribution over time. Interestingly, after controlling for the effect of the leverage ratio we cannot obtain any significant effect of the BIS capital adequacy ratio. We also find that the size of the bank is associated with its systemic risk contribution only in the cross-sectional dimension.
Lastly, this paper has also proposed the aggregate MES for use as an overall In this study we have focused only on stock market information for deriving our systemic risk measures. However, there may be other valuable information -e.g. CDS premia, option prices or other macro and financial variables -for assessing these systemic risk measures. How to integrate such market or macro information into the assessment of systemic risk will be an important future research topic. 
